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Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) considered the problem where a
finite set of agents who originally make up a society has to decide which
candidates, to be chosen from a given set, will become new members of the
society. They analyzed this problem without considering the possibility that
current members of the society may want to leave it as a result of its change
in composition. In particular, they characterized voting by committees as the
class of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions whenever founders’
preferences over subsets of candidates are either separable or additively rep-
resentable and founders cannot leave the society.
In this paper we are interested in studying the consequences of considering
explicitly the possibility that founders have the option to leave the group
in case they do not like the resulting composition of the society. In our
context, a social choice function is a rule that associates with each founders’
preference profile a newly composed society consisting of both candidates
and founders. This set up is suﬃciently general to include as social choice
functions mechanisms which select, given each founders’ preference profile,
the new composition of the society in a potentially complex procedure. For
instance, mechanisms where the subset of admitted candidates is first selected
(using a pre-specified voting rule) and then founders decide sequentially to
stay or to leave the society after being informed about the chosen candidates.
Notice that our framework is not a particular case of Barberà, Sonnen-
schein, and Zhou’s (1991) model. One of the main consequences of the fact
that a founder might leave the society is that each founder’s preferences have
to be defined on subsets where he is excluded. We will assume that founders
are indiﬀerent between any pair of societies to which they do not belong.
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Moreover, for all societies containing a given founder, we will assume, as
in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991), that this founder has separable
preferences. A founder has separable preferences if the division between good
and bad agents guides the ordering of subsets of agents, in the sense that
adding a good agent leads to a better set, while adding a bad agent leads
to a worse set. However, when considered as binary relations on the set of
all possible societies our separability condition is not the same as Barberà,
Sonnenschein, and Zhou’s (1991).1
We are especially interested in social choice functions satisfying the prop-
erty that no founder ever has an incentive to misrepresent his preferences in
order to obtain personal advantages. Functions satisfying this property are
called strategy-proof social choice functions.2 In order to capture the main
feature of our problem, we will concentrate on social choice functions that
are stable in the sense that no founder that remains in the final society wants
to leave it (internal stability) and no founder that left the society wants to
rejoin it (external stability). Finally, we require that social choice functions
satisfy the property of founder’s sovereignty on the set of candidates. It im-
plies that a function must be sensitive to founders’ preferences in two ways:
all commonly agreed good candidates have to be elected, and no commonly
agreed bad candidates can be elected.
Our main result demonstrates that the unique strategy-proof and stable
social choice function satisfying founder’s sovereignty on the set of candi-
dates is the one such that, for each profile of separable preferences satisfying
1At the end of Section 3, and after presenting Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou’s (1991)
model, we compare the two preference domains.
2See Sprumont (1995), Barberà (1996), and Barberà (2001) for three excellent surveys
on strategy-proofness.
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the non-initial exit condition,3 the final chosen society consists of all initial
founders and the unanimously good candidates. In other words, founders do
not leave the society, but the existence of such a possibility reduces substan-
tially the number of ways candidates are elected. Stability requires the use of
the most qualified majority to get candidates in. But again, this extremely
qualified majority makes exit unnecessary since each founder has veto power
for all candidates and the original society was originally acceptable for all
founders.4 We also show that not only stability, strategy-proofness, and
founder’s sovereignty on the set of candidates are independent properties
but also that once we relax one of the two stability criteria new social choice
functions appear where some founders leave the society at some preference
profiles.
However, our model is not limited to the interpretation given so far;
i.e., the choice of the composition of the final society. It can be also used
to analyze the problem where a society has to define its formal and public
positions on a set of issues. One can think of political parties or religious
communities deciding on diﬀerent issues like abortion, death penalty, health
reform, and so on. A social choice function should be understood as deciding
both on the composition of the new society (as a set of members) and on the
set of approved issues. We require that the first decision be stable.
3A profile of preferences satisfies the non-initial exit condition if no founder wants to
exit the initial society. See condition (C4) in Section 2 for a formal statement of this
property.
4Regional free trade associations and alliances such as NATO seem to generally require
unanimous assent, or something close to it, before admitting new members. The impor-
tance of stability in connection with such organizations is evident, and this paper gives a
strong theoretical connection between stability and conservative standards for admitting
new members.
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Before concluding this Introduction, we want to comment on two lines of
research existing in the literature. The first one is composed of two recent
and related papers. Barberà, Maschler, and Shalev (2001) consider a society
that, during a fixed and commonly known number of periods, may admit
in each period a subset of new members. Within this dynamic setup, an
interesting issue arises: voters, at earlier stages, vote not only according
to whether or not they like a candidate but also according to their tastes
concerning future candidates. They study the particular case where agents
have dichotomous preferences (candidates are either friends or enemies) and
the voting rule used by the society is quota one (it is suﬃcient to receive
one vote to be elected). They identify and study (subgame perfect and
trembling-hand perfect) equilibria where agents exhibit, due to the dynamics
of the game, complex strategic voting behavior.
Granot, Maschler, and Shalev (2000) study a similar model with expul-
sion; current members of the society have to decide each period whether to
admit new members into the society and whether to expel current members
of the society for good. They study equilibria for diﬀerent protocols which
depend on whether the expulsion decision has to be taken each period either
simultaneously with, before, or after the admission decision.
In contrast to the works cited above, our framework is static. In partic-
ular, candidates in our model do not count: they do not have preferences
over societies. We are implicitly assuming that they want to become new
members of the society regardless of its final composition, and this is re-
strictive. But this hypothesis allows us to include the interpretation oﬀered
earlier where the society has to decide a subset of binary issues which cannot
have preferences. Moreover, our paper also diﬀers from the mentioned ones
because of the following three features. First, our focus is on voluntary exit
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rather than expulsion; it seems to us that voluntary exit is a relevant and
common problem societies face (members often leave a society just by not re-
newing their annual membership rather than being expelled). Second, we do
not restrict ourselves to specific protocols or specific voting rules. Our setup
is general and corresponds to the standard framework used in social choice
theory: social choice functions mapping agents’ preferences into the set of
social alternatives. Third, our main interest is in identifying strategy-proof
social choice functions instead of analyzing diﬀerent types of equilibria.
The second line of research started with a work by Dutta, Jackson, and Le
Breton (2001) on candidate stability by considering only single-valued voting
rules, and continued with the work of Ehlers and Weymark (2003), Eraslan
and McLennan (2001), and Rodríguez-Álvarez (2001) on multi-valued voting
rules. In these papers, a set of voters and a set of candidates (which may
overlap) must select a representative candidate (or a subset of them). The
key issue this literature addresses is the incentives of candidates, given a par-
ticular voting rule (how voters choose a candidate or a subset of candidates),
to enter or exit the election in order to strategically aﬀect the outcome of the
rule. By imposing some independence conditions and an “internal stability”
condition (the losing candidates must not have an incentive to drop out of
the election) they prove that the class of voting rules immune to this strate-
gic manipulation is only composed of dictatorial rules. In contrast to our
paper, these articles consider the stability condition to be “strategic” in the
sense that, if considering exiting, an agent anticipates the new choice with
the smaller set of candidates.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce preliminary notation
and basic definitions in Section 2. Section 3 contains the description and
characterization of voting by committees due to Barberà, Sonnenschein, and
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Zhou (1991) and compares both models (with and without exit). In Section 4
we state and prove our main result and in Section 5 we show the independence
of the axioms characterizing it. Section 6 analyzes the relevancy of the non-
initial exit condition for our result. Some concluding remarks are included in
Section 7 while all omitted proofs of Section 5 are in the Appendix.
2 Preliminary Notation and Definitions
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of founders of a society and K= {n+ 1, ..., k}
be the set of candidates who may become new members of the society. We
assume that n and k are finite, n ≥ 2, and k ≥ 3. Founders have preferences
over 2N∪K , the set of all possible final societies. We identify the empty set
with the situation where the society has no members.5
Founder i’s preferences over 2N∪K , denoted by Ri, is a complete and
transitive binary relation. As usual, let Pi and Ii denote the strict and
indiﬀerence preference relations induced by Ri, respectively. We suppose
that founders’ preferences satisfy the following conditions:
(C1) Strictness: For all S, S0 ⊂ N ∪K, S 6= S0 such that i ∈ N ∩S ∩S0,
either SPiS0 or S0PiS.
(C2) Indifference: For all S such that i /∈ S, SIi∅.
(C3) Loneliness: (a) {i}Ri∅. (b) If SIi∅ and i ∈ S, then S = {i}.
(C4) Non-initial Exit: For all i ∈ N , NPiN\ {i}.
Strictness means that founder i’s preferences over sets containing himself
5Remember that, as we already argued in the Introduction, we could interpret the set
K as the set of issues that the society has to decide upon. In this case the interpretation
of a final society is the subset of approved issues and the subset of members that remain
in the society.
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are strict. Indifference means that founder i is indiﬀerent between not
belonging to the society and the situation where the society has no members.
Part (a) of Loneliness means that either founder i finds specific benefits to
being the only member of the society (in which case {i}Pi∅) or else, founder
i could provide them without being a member of the society (in which case
{i}Ii∅), while part (b) says that the only society containing i that may be
indiﬀerent to not being in the society is the society formed by i alone. Finally,
the Non-initial Exit condition says that no founder wants to exit the
initial society.6
We denote by Ri the set of all such preferences for founder i, by R the
Cartesian product R1×· · ·×Rn, by bRi a generic subset of Ri, and by bR the
Cartesian product bR1× · · · × bRn. Notice that conditions (C1), (C2), (C3),
and (C4) are founder specific and therefore Ri 6= Rj for diﬀerent founders i
and j. Given Ri ∈ Ri, denote by τ(Ri) the best element of 2N∪K according
to Ri. As a consequence of conditions (C1), (C2), and (C4) this element is
unique.
A preference profile R = (R1, ..., Rn) ∈ R is a n-tuple of preferences. It
will be represented by (Ri, R−i) to emphasize the role of founder i’s prefer-
ence.
A social choice function f is a function f : bR −→ 2N∪K . Given a social
choice function f , we will denote by fN and fK the functions that specify
the subsets of N and K, respectively. Namely, fN(R) = f(R) ∩ N and
fK(R) = f(R) ∩K for all R ∈ bR.
Now we define two basic properties that social choice functions may sat-
isfy. The first one is strategy-proofness. It says that no founder can gain by
6In Section 6 we will argue that we need condition (C4) for the existence of “stable”
social choice functions.
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lying when reporting his preferences.
Definition 1 A social choice function f : bR → 2N∪K is strategy-proof if




If f (R0i, R−i)Pif(R), we say that founder i manipulates f at profile R via
R0i.
We are especially interested in social choice functions satisfying the prop-
erty of stability in a double sense: internal stability (no founder that remains
in the final society wants to leave it) and external stability (no founder that
left the society wants to rejoin it). Formally,
Definition 2 A social choice function f : bR→ 2N∪K satisfies internal sta-
bility if for all R ∈ bR,
i ∈ f(R) ∩N =⇒ f(R)Ri (f(R)\ {i}) .
A social choice function f : bR → 2N∪K satisfies external stability if for all
R ∈ bR,
i ∈ N and i /∈ f(R) =⇒ f(R)Ri (f(R) ∪ {i}) .
A social choice function f is stable if f satisfies internal and external sta-
bility.
As in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) we will restrict ourselves
to preferences that order subsets of agents (containing agent i) according to
two basic characteristics of their elements. Consider a preference Ri ∈ Ri
and an agent j ∈ K ∪ N\ {i}. We say that j is good for i according to Ri
whenever {j, i}Pi{i}; otherwise, we say that j is bad for i according to Ri.
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Denote by G(Ri) and B(Ri) the set of good and bad agents for i according to
Ri, respectively. To simplify notation, let GK(Ri) = G(Ri) ∩K, BK(Ri) =
B(Ri)∩K, and GN(Ri) = G(Ri)∩N . Now, we are ready to formally define
separable preferences.
Definition 3 A preference Ri ∈ Ri is separable if for all j ∈ K ∪ N\{i}
and S ⊂ N ∪K\{j} such that i ∈ S,
[{j} ∪ S]PiS if and only if j ∈ G(Ri).
Let Si⊂ Ri denote the set of separable preferences for founder i that
satisfy (C1)-(C4) and let S denote the Cartesian product S1 × ...× Sn.
A careful examination of all preferences used in all proofs below shows
that the statements of our results still hold if we consider social choice func-
tions defined on the subdomain of additive preferences, where a preference
Ri ∈ Ri is said to be additive if there exists a function ui : N ∪K∪{∅}→ IR
such that for all S and S0 with i ∈ S ∩ S0,
SPiS






SPi∅ if and only if
P
x∈S ui(x) > ui(∅).
Note that additivity implies separability but the converse is false for k > 3,
since a separable ordering R1 could simultaneously have {1, 3}P1{1, 4} and
{1, 2, 4}P1{1, 2, 3}. However, if R1 were additive, {1, 3}P1{1, 4} would imply
{1, 2, 3}P1{1, 2, 4}, but this would seem too restrictive, though, to capture
some degree of complementarity among agents, which can be very natural in
our setting.
We are also interested in social choice functions satisfying the property of
founder’s sovereignty on K in a double sense. Namely, candidates that are
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good for all founders have to be admitted to the society. On the contrary,
candidates that are bad for all founders cannot be admitted. Formally,
Definition 4 A social choice function f : bR → 2N∪K satisfies founder’s
sovereignty on K if for all R ∈ bR,T
i∈N




Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) characterized the class of strategy-
proof and onto social choice functions without exit (see Proposition 1 in
Section 3). They used the phrase voters’ sovereignty to indicate the onto
condition (for all K 0 ⊆ K, there exists R ∈ bR such that fK (R) = K 0). Our
founder’s sovereignty (on K) condition is stronger. However, our condition is
reasonable because, in addition to ontoness, it only requires the natural co-
herence between the preference profile and its corresponding subset of elected
candidates.
3 Voting by Committees
In this Section we first present the main ingredients of Barberà, Sonnenschein,
and Zhou’s (1991) model in order to state their characterization of voting by
committees, on which part of our proof is built. We finish the Section with
a discussion of the diﬀerences between the two models.
Since in the problem considered by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou
(1991) founders cannot leave the society, the social alternatives are subsets
of candidates. Therefore, founder i’s preferences, denoted by %i, is a com-
plete, asymmetric and transitive binary relation over 2K . As usual, let Âi
denote the strict preference relation induced by %i. Let τ(%i) denote the
best element of 2K according to %i and let %= (%1, ...,%n) be a preference
profile.
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Definition 5 A preference %i is BSZ-separable if for all S ⊆ K and all
x /∈ S,
S ∪ {x} Âi S if and only if {x} Âi ∅.
Let SBSZi be the set of all BSZ-separable preferences on 2K (note that
this set is the same for all founders) and let SBSZ = SBSZ1 × ...× SBSZn .
A voting scheme g is a function from SBSZ to 2K . A voting scheme g
is strategy-proof if it satisfies the natural translation of Definition 1 to this
setup.
We now turn to defining voting by committees. Rules in this class are
defined by a collection of families of winning coalitions (committees), one
for each candidate. Founders vote for sets of candidates. To be elected, a
candidate must get the vote of all members of some coalition among those
that are winning for that candidate. Formally,
Definition 6 A committee W is a nonempty family of nonempty coalitions
of N , which satisfies coalition monotonicity in the sense that if I ∈ W and
I 0 ⊇ I, then I 0 ∈W.
Coalition I ∈W is a minimal winning coalition if, for all I 0 ( I, I 0 /∈W.
Given a committeeW we denote byWm the set of minimal winning coalitions
and call it the minimal committee.
Definition 7 A voting scheme g : SBSZ → 2K is voting by committees if
for each x ∈ K, there exists a committee Wx such that for all %∈ SBSZ
x ∈ g(%) if and only if {i ∈ N | x ∈ τ(%i)} ∈Wx.
Proposition 1 (Theorem 1 in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991) A
voting scheme g : SBSZ → 2K is strategy-proof and onto if and only if g is
voting by committees.
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We could now extend voting by committees to our context by saying that
a social choice function f : S → 2N∪K is voting by committees if for each
agent x (founder and candidate) there exists a committee Wx such that for
all R ∈ S,
x ∈ f(R) if and only if {i ∈ N | x ∈ τ(Ri)} ∈Wx.
We now argue that the two models are diﬀerent due to fundamental dif-
ferences of the two preference domains. The following three are crucial.
First, to deal with voluntary exit and voluntary membership we allow a
founder’s preference of joining a society to depend on the other members in
the society; that is, founder i may prefer joining a society S to not joining it,
i.e., S ∪ {i}PiS and at the same time, prefer not joining another society S0
to joining it, i.e., S0PiS0∪{i} (so BSZ-separability is violated). Second, each
founder is indiﬀerent to any two societies to which he does not belong. Third,
each founder belongs to his best society; that is, i ∈ τ(Ri) for all Ri ∈ Si
and i ∈ N (this holds by transitivity and (C2) since τ(Ri)RiN and NPi∅
by (C4)). We think that these three aspects are meaningful and necessary
to deal with the social choice problem we want to study here. We want
to emphasize that, due to these domain diﬀerences, Barberà, Sonnenschein,
and Zhou’s (1991) model cannot be applied directly here, although we will
use their main result after showing that no founder ever wants to leave the
society.
Furthermore, and as a consequence of the fact that each i belongs to τ(Ri)
(each founder always votes for himself) we have now an insubstantial multi-
plicity of voting by committees inducing the same social choice function. To
see that, consider the following two possibilities. On the one hand, consider
any pair of committees W and W 0 such that Wx = W 0x for all x ∈ K and
for any founder i, W 0i = {{S ∪ {i}}S∈Wi}. Since i ∈ τ(Ri) for all i ∈ N and
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all Ri ∈ Si, we conclude that both committee structures (W andW 0) induce
the same social choice function. On the other hand, if W and W 0 are such
that {i} ∈Wi and {i} ∈W 0i for all i ∈ N , andWx =W 0x for all x ∈ K, then
both committee structures induce the same social choice function. There-
fore, because of these two situations, from now on and in order to state our
results more compactly, we will assume that a committee for founder i is a
nonempty family of subsets containing i. Formally,
Definition 8 A social choice function f : S → 2N∪K is voting by commit-
tees if for each x ∈ N ∪ K there exists a committee Wx such that for all
R ∈ S,
x ∈ f(R) if and only if {i ∈ N | x ∈ τ(Ri)} ∈Wx,
where for all i ∈ N and all I ∈Wi, i ∈ I.
4 The Characterization Result
Theorem 1 below characterizes the class of strategy-proof and stable so-
cial choice functions satisfying founder’s sovereignty on K as the voting by
committees social choice function satisfying the properties that the mini-
mal committee of each founder is himself and the minimal committee for
each candidate is the set of all founders. That is, it is the single rule which
chooses, for each preference profile, the final society consisting of all initial
founders and all unanimously good candidates. Formally,
Theorem 1 Let f : S −→ 2N∪K be a social choice function. Then, f is
strategy-proof, stable, and satisfies founder’s sovereignty on K if and only if
f is voting by committees with the following two properties:
(Founders) For all i ∈ N , Wmi = {{i}}.
(Candidates) For all x ∈ K, Wmx = {N}.
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Remember that the assumptions about the domain, (C1)-(C4), have
been incorporated into the definition of S.
Remark 1 Alternatively, we can write the social choice function character-
ized above as follows: for all R ∈ S, f(R) = N ∪ ( T
i∈N
GK(Ri)).




GK (Ri)). Clearly, f satisfies external stability and founder’s
sovereignty on K. Since fN(R) = N , fK(R) ⊂ GK(Ri) for all i ∈ N ,
and preferences are separable and satisfy (C2) and (C4), we have that
f(R)RiNPiN\{i}Ii (f(R)\ {i}) for all i ∈ N which shows that f satisfies
internal stability.
To show that f is strategy-proof, let i ∈ N , R ∈ S, and R0i ∈ Si be ar-
bitrary and suppose that f(R) 6= f(R0i, R−i) (otherwise, the proof is trivial).
Since fN(R) = fN(R0i, R−i) = N , there must exist x ∈ K such that either
x ∈ fK(R) and x /∈ fK(R0i, R−i) or else x /∈ fK(R) and x ∈ fK(R0i, R−i).
Note that for both cases, fK(R) =
T
j∈N
GK (Rj) and fK(R0i, R−i) = G
0 ∪ B0
where G0 ⊂ GK(Ri), B0 ⊂ BK(Ri), and G0 ⊂
T
j∈N
GK (Rj). Then, since Ri is
a separable preference we obtain (N ∪
T
j∈N
GK (Rj))Pi (N ∪G0 ∪B0); that is,
f(R)Pif(R
0
i, R−i) which shows that f is strategy-proof.
To prove necessity, let f be a strategy-proof and stable social choice
function satisfying founder’s sovereignty on K. First note that the following
claim holds.
Claim 1 If R ∈ S is such that GK (Ri) = A for all i ∈ N , then f (R) =
N ∪A.
Proof of Claim 1 Let R ∈ S be such that GK (Ri) = A for all i ∈
N . By founder’s sovereignty on K, fK(R) = A. To prove that fN(R) =
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N we use an induction argument. First observe that fN(R) 6= N\ {i}
for all i ∈ N ; otherwise, if fN(R) = N\ {i} for some i ∈ N , f would
not be externally stable since, by separability of Ri, (N ∪ fK(R))RiN , by
(C4), NPiN\{i}, by (C2), N\{i}Ii(N ∪ fK(R))\{i}, and by transitivity,
(N ∪ fK(R))Pi (N ∪ fK(R)) \ {i}.
Induction hypothesis: Suppose that for all R ∈ S such that GK(Ri) = A
for all i ∈ N and for all S ⊂ N such that 1 ≤ #S ≤ s < n, fN(R) 6= N \ S.7
We will show that for all R ∈ S such that GK(Ri) = A for all i ∈ N and for
all T ⊂ N with #T = s+1, fN(R) 6= N\T . Suppose there exists R ∈ S and
T ⊂ N with #T = s+ 1 such that fN(R) = N \ T .
Consider i1 ∈ T and R0i1 ∈ Si1 such that G(R0i1) = (N \ {i1}) ∪ A and
{i1}P 0i1∅. We define R(1) = (R0i1 , R−i1). By founder’s sovereignty on K,
fK(R
(1)) = A. Note that f(R(1)) ⊂ G(R0i1) ∪ {i1}. Then, by separability¡
f(R(1)) ∪ {i1}
¢
P 0i1∅ and by external stability, i1 ∈ fN(R(1)). The induc-
tion hypothesis implies that we can write fN(R(1)) = N\T (1) for some T (1)
such that #T (1) ∈ [s + 1, n − 1] or #T (1) = 0. If #T (1) = 0, that is,
fN(R
(1)) = N , we have that f(R(1)) = (N ∪A)Pi1∅Ii1f (R), which means
that i1 manipulates f at R via R0i1 contradicting strategy-proofness of f .
Thus, #T (1) ∈ [s+ 1, n− 1].
Consider i2 ∈ T (1) and R0i2 ∈ Si2 such that G(R0i2) = (N \ {i2}) ∪ A
and {i2}P 0i2∅. Define R(2) = (R0i2, R(1)−i2). Using similar arguments to those
used above for i1 we can conclude that {i1, i2} ⊂ fN(R(2)) = N \ T (2) where
#T (2) ≥ s+1. Repeating this process we obtain that there exists V ⊂ N such
that V ⊂ fN(R(n−s)) = N \ T (n−s) where #T (n−s) ≥ s+ 1 and #V = n− s,
which is a contradiction.
7The symbol # stands for the cardinality of a set. Observe that fN (R) 6= N\S means
that fN (R) either equals N or has less than n− s elements.
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We decompose the necessity part of the proof into two Lemmata.
Lemma 1 For all R ∈ S, fN (R) = N .
Proof of Lemma 1 We use an induction argument over all good candi-
dates. Let R ∈ S be arbitrary and define m = P
i∈N
#GK(Ri). If m = 0, we
get that fN(R) = N by Claim 1.
Induction hypothesis: Suppose that fN(R) = N holds for all R ∈ S such
that m ≤ l.
To prove that i ∈ f(R) for all i ∈ N and all R ∈ S such that m = l + 1, we
distinguish the following two cases:
• GK (Ri) 6= ∅.
Consider any R0i ∈ Si with the properties that GK (R0i) = ∅, G (R0i) =
GN (Ri), and
if SR0i∅, then SRi∅. (1)
The reader can check that, by making all candidates in GK (Ri) ex-
tremely bad (i.e., ∅P 0iS whenever S ∩ K 6= ∅), such a preference ex-
ists. By the induction hypothesis, fN (R0i, R−i) = N. By strategy-





By condition (1) in the construction of R0i, f (R
0
i, R−i)Ri∅. Since N ⊆
f (R0i, R−i) and part (b) of the loneliness condition (C3), f (R
0
i, R−i)Pi∅.
Therefore, by transitivity of Ri, f (R)Pi∅ holds. Moreover, by the in-
diﬀerence condition (C2), i ∈ f (R).
• GK (Ri) = ∅.
Suppose that i /∈ f(R). Since m ≥ 1, there exists j ∈ N such
that GK(Rj) 6= ∅. By the previous case, j ∈ f(R). Consider any
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= ∅ and SP 0jS0 for all S, S0
















, which contradicts strategy-proofness.
Hence, for all R ∈ S, fN(R) = N .




Proof of Lemma 2 We will now use the result of Barberà, Sonnenschein,
and Zhou (1991) stated in Proposition 1 above. In order to do so, we will
identify our fK : S → 2K with a voting scheme over SBSZ, g : SBSZ → 2K as
follows: Given %i∈ SBSZi choose any Ri ∈ Si such that (N ∪ S)Pi (N ∪ S0)
if and only if S Âi S0 for all distinct S, S0 ∈ 2K . Therefore, we have defined
a mapping p : SBSZ → S; notice that there are many p’s. Define g : SBSZ →
2K as follows: g(%) := fK(p(%)) for all %∈ SBSZ . We want to show that g
is well-defined, strategy-proof, and onto.
• g is well-defined.
It is suﬃcient to show that, for all %∈ SBSZ , fK(p1(%)) = fK (p2 (%))
for any pair of functions p1 and p2. Assume otherwise; that is, there ex-
ist %∈ SBSZ, p1 and p2 such that fK(p1(%)) = S1 6= S2 = fK (p2 (%)) .
Hence, p1(%) 6= p2(%). Let p1(%) = (R11, ..., R1n) and p2 (%) = (R21, ..., R2n)
be the two diﬀerent preference profiles. By Lemma 1, all f (R) are of
the form N ∪ S; going from f (R1) = N ∪ S1 to f (R2) = N ∪ S2,
there exist M ⊆ N and i ∈ M such that f(R1M , R2−M) = N ∪ S1 and
f(R1M\{i}, R
2
−(M\{i})) = N∪T with T 6= S1 (eventually, T could be equal
to S2). By the strictness condition (C1) either (N ∪ T )P 1i (N ∪ S1)
or (N ∪ S1)P 1i (N ∪ T ). If (N ∪ T )P 1i (N ∪ S1), then i manipulates
18




i . If (N ∪ S1)P 1i (N ∪ T ), and hence
(N ∪ S1)P 2i (N ∪ T ), then imanipulates f at profile (R1M\{i}, R2−(M\{i}))
with R1i .
• g is strategy-proof.
Assume otherwise; that is, there exist %∈ SBSZ, i ∈ N , and %0i∈ SBSZi
such that g(%0i,%−i) Âi g(%). Since g is well-defined, we can find
R ∈ S, R0i ∈ Si, and p such that p(%) = R and p(%0i,%−i) = (R0i, R−i).
Therefore, by Lemma 1 and the definition of g and p, f(R0i, R−i) =
(N ∪ g(%0i,%−i))Pi (N ∪ g(%)) = f(R), which implies that f is not
strategy-proof.
• g is onto 2K.
This is an immediate consequence of Claim 1, using the definitions of
g and p.
Then by Proposition 1, g is voting by committees. Let {Wx}x∈K be its as-
sociated family of committees. We next show that f is voting by committees.
Given R ∈ S let p and %∈ SBSZ be such that p(%) = R (the strictness condi-
tion (C1) guarantees the existence of a unique preference profile %). Notice
that, for all i ∈ N , separability implies that GK(Ri) = τ(%i). Therefore, for
each x ∈ K,
x ∈ fK(R) ⇐⇒ x ∈ g(%)
⇐⇒ {i ∈ N | x ∈ τ(%i)} ∈Wx
⇐⇒ {i ∈ N | x ∈ GK(Ri)} ∈Wx
To show that all minimal committees coincide with {N}, assume that
there exist x ∈ K and S ( N such that S ∈Wmx . Take i ∈ N\S and R ∈ S
where for all j ∈ S, x ∈ GK(Rj), and
∅PiT whenever x ∈ T. (2)
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Then, x ∈ f(R). By Lemma 1, i ∈ f(R). But this and conditions (C2) and
(2) contradict internal stability of f . This ends the proof of Lemma 2.
By Remark 1, the statement of Theorem 1 follows from Lemmata 1 and
2.
5 Independence of the Axioms
In this Section we show the independence of all properties used in the char-
acterization of Theorem 1.
Note first that the constant function f (R) = N for all R ∈ S is strategy-
proof and stable but it does not satisfy founder’s sovereignty on K.
Second, there exist social choice functions satisfying founder’s sovereignty
on K and stability but not strategy-proofness. For any R ∈ S define
T (R) = {S ⊂ S
j∈N
GK (Rj) | (N ∪ S)Ri(N ∪ (
T
j∈N
GK (Rj)) for all i ∈ N}.
Consider now the social choice function f : S → 2N∪K such that f (R) =
N ∪B where B ∈ T (R) and (N ∪B)P1 (N ∪ S) for any S ∈ T (R) \{B}. Of
course f satisfies founder’s sovereignty on K and stability. Because fK (R)
is not equal to
T
i∈N GK (Ri) for all R ∈ S, Theorem 1 implies that f is not
strategy-proof.
Third, there exist strategy-proof social choice functions satisfying founder’s
sovereignty on K that, although they are not stable, satisfy either internal
or external stability. Propositions 2 and 3 below identify, among the class
of voting by committees, those that are internal and external stable, respec-
tively.
To state Proposition 2 we need the following definitions. We say that a
committee Wi is unanimous if Wmi = {N}; decisive if Wmi = {{i}}; and
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bipersonal ifWmi = {{i, j}j∈N\{i}}. When n = 3 we say that the committees
Wi, Wj, and Wl are cyclical if Wmi = {{i, j}}, Wmj = {{j, l}}, and Wml =
{{l, i}}.
Proposition 2 Assume f : S −→ 2N∪K is voting by committees. Then, f
satisfies internal stability if and only if:
(Candidates) Wmx = {N}, for all x ∈ K.
(Founders) When n ≥ 4, either (i) Wi is unanimous for all i ∈ N or (ii) for
all i ∈ N , Wi is either decisive or bipersonal. When n = 3, either (i) Wi
is unanimous for all i ∈ N , (ii) {W1,W2,W3} are cyclical, or (iii) for all
i ∈ N , Wi is either decisive or bipersonal.
Proof See the Appendix.
We now characterize the set of voting by committees satisfying external
stability.8
Proposition 3 Assume f : S −→ 2N∪K is voting by committees. Then, f
satisfies external stability if and only if for all i ∈ N, Wmi = {{i}}.
Proof See the Appendix.
Fourth, all voting by committees social choice functions satisfy strategy-
proofness and founder’s sovereignty onK. Other rules satisfying both proper-
ties can be defined by dropping the non-emptiness condition for committees.
For instance, those where a subset of founders N1 is always in the society and
another subset N2 is never in the society. These can be expressed as general-
ized voting by committees by allowing that the committees of all founders in
8Observe that the two characterizations in Propositions 2 and 3 are established assum-
ing voting by committees. We conjecture that they will still be valid, if instead, we assume
that f is a strategy-proof social choice function respecting founder’s sovereignty on K.
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N2 be empty (that is, without any winning coalition) and for all i ∈ N1 the
committees of founder i have the singleton {i} as minimal winning coalition.
6 Necessity of the Non-initial Exit Condition
In this section we argue that the non-initial exit condition (C4) is indispens-
able for the existence of stable social choice functions; that is, there might
not exist social choice functions satisfying stability if (C1), (C2), and (C3)
hold but (C4) fails. Examples 1 and 2 below illustrate this fact for separable
and non-separable preferences, respectively. Observe that the constant func-
tion f (R1, ..., Rn) = N for all (R1, ..., Rn) in any domain is stable as long as
Ri satisfies (C4) for all i ∈ N .
Example 1 Assume that N = {1, 2, 3} (K could be any set of candidates).
Let R be the additive preference profile induced by the following utility func-
tions:
u1 u2 u3
1 1 10 −5
2 −5 1 2
3 10 −5 1
x ∈ K ±εx ±εx ±εx
∅ 0 0 0





Notice that ∅P3N and by (C2) (Indiﬀerence) N\ {3} I3∅. Thus, (C4)
(Non-initial exit) fails since N\ {3} I3∅P3N. We now check that there is no
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social choice function satisfying stability. Let X denote any arbitrary subset
of K.
• If f (R) = X, then f does not satisfy external stability because 1 /∈
f (R) and (X ∪ {1})P1X.
• If f (R) = {1} ∪X, then f does not satisfy external stability because
2 /∈ f (R) and (f (R) ∪ {2})P2f (R) .
• If f (R) = {2} ∪X, then f does not satisfy external stability because
3 /∈ f (R) and (f (R) ∪ {3})P3f (R) .
• If f (R) = {3} ∪X, then f does not satisfy external stability because
1 /∈ f (R) and (f (R) ∪ {1})P1f (R) .
• If f (R) = {1, 2}∪X, then f does not satisfy internal stability because
1 ∈ f (R) and (f (R) \ {1})P1f (R) .
• If f (R) = {1, 3}∪X, then f does not satisfy internal stability because
3 ∈ f (R) and (f (R) \ {3})P3f (R) .
• If f (R) = {2, 3}∪X, then f does not satisfy internal stability because
2 ∈ f (R) and (f (R) \ {2})P2f (R) .
• If f (R) = N ∪ X, then f does not satisfy internal stability because
3 ∈ f (R) and (f (R) \ {3})P3f (R) .
Example 2 Assume that N = {1, 2, 3} and K = ∅. Consider the non-
separable preference profile R = (R1, R2, R3) where
{1, 2}P1 {1}P1∅P1 {1, 3}P1 {1, 2, 3}
{2, 3}P2 {2}P2∅P2 {1, 2}P2 {1, 2, 3}
{1, 3}P3 {3}P3∅P3 {2, 3}P3 {1, 2, 3} .
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Observe that for any i ∈ N the non-initial exit condition (C4) does not hold
since N\ {i} Ii∅PiN . There is no “stable” set of members; that is, for any
S ⊆ N either (1) there exists i ∈ S such that S\ {i}PiS or (2) there exists
j /∈ S such that S ∪ {j}PjS. Thus, it is not possible to define a stable social
choice function on any domain of preferences containing R.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have expanded Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou’s (1991)
framework of a society choosing new members to allow the possibility of
voluntary exit from the society. The voluntary nature of exit is modelled by
requiring that outcomes be stable in the sense that each founder prefers the
outcome to the one that would result if his membership status was reversed.
We have shown that strategy-proofness, stability, and founder’s sovereignty
on the set of candidates are equivalent to a particular form of voting by
committees: founders decide for themselves whether to stay or leave, and
new members are admitted if and only if they are unanimously approved by
the founders.
There are a number of questions not answered in this paper. First, and
since our primary interest is on voluntary exit, we have not fully character-
ized the class of strategy-proof social choice functions, although we think
that they are also voting by committees. In addition, we conjecture that
our founder’s sovereignty on K condition (defined as an unanimity condi-
tion over candidate decisions) could be weakened to a full-range condition
over candidate decisions. Second, we do not know if there is a meaningful
characterization of the maximal domain of preferences under which stable
and strategy-proof social choice functions exist. Third, we have not analyzed
24
here the (subgame perfect) equilibrium voting behavior of founders who take
into account the eﬀect of their votes not only on the chosen candidates, but
also on the final composition of the society (see Berga, Bergantiños, Massó,
and Neme (2003) for a subgame perfect equilibrium analysis of exiting after
voting in a general set up).
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 First, we define the set of vetoers of Wi as the
set Vi = {j ∈ N\{i} | j ∈ S for all S ∈Wi}. We will use the following result.
Lemma 3 Assume that f : S −→ 2N∪K is voting by committees and that f
satisfies internal stability.
(a) Suppose that n ≥ 3 and there exist i, j ∈ N such that i 6= j and {i, j} /∈
Wj. Then, for all l ∈ N\{i, j}, i ∈ Vl.
(b) Suppose that n ≥ 3 and there exist i, j ∈ N such that i 6= j and i ∈ Vj.
Then for all l ∈ N \ {i, j}, l ∈ Vq for all q ∈ N \ {l, j}.
(c) Suppose that n ≥ 4 and there exist i, j ∈ N such that i 6= j and i ∈ Vj.
Then for all l ∈ N , l ∈ Vq for all q ∈ N \ {l}.
Proof (a) We prove it by contradiction. Assume that there exists l ∈
N\{i, j} such that i /∈ Vl. Let R be a preference profile satisfying:
• τ (Ri) = (N \ {l})∪K. Given S ⊂ N ∪K such that i ∈ S, if j /∈ S and
l ∈ S, then ∅PiS.
• τ (Rj) = N ∪K.
• τ (Rr) = (N \ {j}) ∪K for all r ∈ N \ {i, j} .
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Since {i, j} /∈Wj we conclude that j /∈ f(R). Moreover, l ∈ f (R) because
i /∈ Vl.Agents of (N\{j, l})∪K belong to f (R) because they are unanimously
good. But this contradicts internal stability since i ∈ f (R) = (N \ {j})∪K
and ∅Pif (R) .
(b) We prove it by contradiction. Assume that there exist l ∈ N\{i, j}
and q ∈ N \ {l, j} such that l /∈ Vq. Let R be a preference profile satisfying:
• τ (Ri) = (N \ {j}) ∪K.
• τ (Rl) = (N \ {q}) ∪K. Given S ⊂ N ∪ K such that l ∈ S, if j /∈ S
and q ∈ S, then ∅PlS.
• τ (Rr) = (N \ {j}) ∪K for all r ∈ N \ {i, l} .
Since i ∈ Vj we conclude that j /∈ f(R). Moreover, q ∈ f (R) because l /∈
Vq. Agents of (N \ {j, q})∪K belong to f (R) because they are unanimously
good. But this contradicts internal stability since l ∈ f (R) = (N \ {j})∪K
and ∅Plf (R) .
(c) Without loss of generality assume that 2 ∈ V1. By part (b) we con-
clude that for all i ≥ 3, i ∈ Vq for all q ∈ N \{1, i}. Since 3 ∈ V4, by part (b),
2 ∈ Vi for all i ∈ N \ {2, 4} and 1 ∈ Vi for all i ∈ N \ {1, 4} . Since 4 ∈ V3,
by part (b), 2 ∈ Vi for all i ∈ N \ {2, 3} and 1 ∈ Vi for all i ∈ N \ {1, 3} .
Then, 2 ∈ Vi for all i ∈ N \ {2} and 1 ∈ Vi for all i ∈ N \ {1} . Since 1 ∈ V2,
by part (b), 3 ∈ Vi for all i ∈ N \ {2, 3} . Then, 3 ∈ Vi for all i ∈ N \ {3} .
Similarly, since 1 ∈ V2, by part (b), for all l ≥ 4, l ∈ Vq for all q ∈ N\ {2, l}
Then, l ∈ Vq for all q ∈ N \ {l} . ¥
Assume first that f : S → 2N∪K is voting by committees and satisfies
internal stability. To show that all committees for the candidates are unan-
imous, assume that there exist x ∈ K and S ( N such that S ∈ Wmx . Take
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i ∈ N\S and R ∈ S such that x ∈ GK(Rj) for all j ∈ S, i ∈ GN(Rj) for all
j ∈ N , and
∅PiT whenever x ∈ T. (3)
Then, x ∈ f(R) and i ∈ f(R). But this and condition (3) contradict internal
stability of f .
We now prove the statement for founders distinguishing two cases: (1)
n ≥ 4 and (2) n = 3. No restriction has to be imposed on committees for
n = 2, since for this case we can check that any committee structure defines
voting by committees satisfying internal stability, by (C4) and because i ∈
τ(Ri) for all i ∈ N and for all Ri ∈ Si.
Case 1: n ≥ 4. Again, we consider two cases:
(a) There exist i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, such that {i, j} /∈Wj.
By parts (a) and (c) of Lemma 3, we conclude that for all l ∈ N ,
l ∈ Vq for all q ∈ N \ {l} . Now it is easy to conclude that all
committees are unanimous.
(b) For all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, {i, j} ∈Wj.
Let {N1, N2} be the partition ofN whereN1 = {i ∈ N | {{i}} =Wmi }
andN2 = {i ∈ N | {{i}} 6=Wmi }. Note that one ofN1 orN2 could
be empty. Now it is immediate to conclude that all committees
for founders in N1 are decisive and all committees for founders in
N2 are bipersonal.
Case 2: n = 3. We now distinguish three cases:
(a) There exist i, j, l ∈ N, j ∈ N \ {i} , and l ∈ N \ {i, j} , such that
{i, j} /∈Wi and {i, l} /∈Wi.
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Then Wmi = N , which means that j ∈ Vi and l ∈ Vi. Since j ∈ Vi
(l ∈ Vi) , by part (b) of Lemma 3, l ∈ Vj (j ∈ Vl). Applying again
part (b) of Lemma 3 we conclude that i ∈ Vl (i ∈ Vj).
Hence, for all q ∈ N , q ∈ Vr for all r ∈ N \ {q} . Now it is easy to
conclude that all committees are unanimous.
(b) There exist i, j, l ∈ N, j ∈ N \ {i} , and l ∈ N \ {i, j} , such that
{i, j} /∈Wi but {i, l} ∈Wi.
Then Wmi = {{i, l}} and thus l ∈ Vi. Applying twice part (b) of
Lemma 3 we conclude that j ∈ Vl and i ∈ Vj. For n = 3 this
implies that Wml = {{l, j}} and Wmj = {{j, i}}. That is, the
committees Wi, Wj, and Wl are cyclical.
(c) For all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, {i, j} ∈Wi.
Arguing as in Case 1(b) we obtain that some committees are de-
cisive and some are bipersonal.
We now prove the converse. Assume n ≥ 3 and let f : S → 2N∪K
be a voting by committees as defined in the statement of Proposition 2.
Let R ∈ S and suppose that i ∈ fN(R). Note that since Wmx = {N}
for all x ∈ K, fK(R) ⊂ GK(Ri). Consider first that Wmj = {N} for all
j ∈ N. Then, by separability of Ri and (C3), f (R)Ri {i}Ri∅. Hence, f
satisfies internal stability. Consider now that there exist N1, N2 ⊂ N such
that N1 ∩ N2 = ∅, N1 ∪ N2 = N , and Wmj = {{j}} for all j ∈ N1 while
Wmj0 = {{j0, l}l∈N\{j0}} for all j0 ∈ N2. Then, GN(Ri) ⊂ fN(R) which implies
that N\fN(R) ⊂ BN(Ri). Therefore, by separability of Ri and by condition
(C4), f(R)RifN(R)RiNPi∅. Hence, by (C2), f satisfies internal stability.
Assume now that n = 3. The only case remaining to be considered is
{W1,W2,W3} is cyclic. Without loss of generality suppose thatWm1 = {1, 2},
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Wm2 = {2, 3}, Wm3 = {3, 1}, and i = 1. Then, by (C2), f satisfies internal
stability since the following four conditions hold:
• If 3 ∈ G(R1) (and hence 3 ∈ fN(R)) and fN(R) = {1, 3}, then
f(R)R1fN(R)P1{1}R1∅ by separability of R1 and condition (C3).
• If 3 ∈ G(R1) (and hence 3 ∈ fN(R)) and fN(R) = N , then f(R)R1NP1∅
by separability of R1 and condition (C4).
• If 3 ∈ B(R1) (and hence 3 /∈ fN(R)) and fN(R) = {1}, then f(R)R1{1}R1∅
by separability of R1 and condition (C3).
• If 3 ∈ B(R1) (and hence 3 /∈ fN(R)) and fN(R) = {1, 2}, then
f(R)R1fN(R)P1NP1∅ by separability of R1 and condition (C4). ¥
Proof of Proposition 3 Since i ∈ τ (Ri) for all i ∈ N and all Ri ∈ Si, we
conclude that
[Wmi = {{i}}, for all i ∈ N ]⇐⇒ [N ⊂ f (R) , for all R ∈ S].
Suppose that f is voting by committees and for all i ∈ N, Wmi = {{i}}.
Then f satisfies external stability because N ⊂ f (R) for all R ∈ S.
We now prove the converse by contradiction. Let R ∈ S and i ∈ N be
such that i /∈ f (R) . Consider R0i ∈ Si such that τ (Ri) = τ (R0i) and SP 0i∅
when i ∈ S. Since f is voting by committees we conclude that f (R) =
f (R0i, R−i) . But this contradicts external stability because i /∈ f (R0i, R−i)
and (f (R0i, R−i) ∪ {i})P 0i∅. ¥
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